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FACTORS AFFECTING ETHICAL SOURCES OF EXTERNAL
DEBT FINANCING FOR INDIAN AGRIBUSINESS FIRMS
Amarjit Gill*, Harvinder S. Mand**, John D. Obradovich***, Neil Mathur****
Abstract
Majority of the Indian farmers are financially constrained and pay very high interest rate to private
moneylenders which has a negative impact on the survivability and growth of agribusiness firms.
Because of less strict debt financing requirements farmers become prey to predatory lenders from
private lending institutions that are not controlled by the central bank and may not behave in an
ethical way. The study investigates factors affecting ethical sources of external debt financing by
taking a sample of Indian agribusiness firms. Owners of agribusiness firms were interviewed through
personal visits and telephone calls regarding the factors affecting ethical sources of external debt
financing. The findings show that several factors affect ethical sources of external debt financing for
agribusiness firms in India. This study contributes to the literature on the factors that affect ethical
sources of external debt financing. This study also provides recommendations to improve access to
ethical sources of external debt financing. The findings may be useful for agribusiness owners
(farmers), financial managers, investors, agribusiness management consultants, entrepreneurs, and
other stakeholders.
Keyword: Agribusiness, Ethical Sources of External Debt Financing, Internal Financing Sources,
Collateral, Financial Performance, CEO Duality, Board Size, Corporate Control
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1 Introduction
Majority of the Indian farmers are financially
constrained and pay a very high interest rate to private
moneylenders
(Ghosal
and
Ray,
2015).
Agribusinesses act as the backbone of the Indian
economy by creating more than 1.1 million jobs per
year (Acharya, 2007) and contributing approximately
18.5% to Gross Domestic Products (GDP).
Because of the world financial crisis and
economic difficulties of 2008-2009, credit access has
been increasingly restricted to more financially strong
firms with low debt to equity ratios (Wu, Guan, and
Myers, 2014). Sandhu, Hussain, and Matlay (2012)
argued that Indian farmers encounter barriers in
accessing agricultural credit. This is because control
over access to agricultural credit through financial
institutions (i.e., banks) that behave ethically rests in
the central bank of India and it has strict requirements
for agribusiness debt financing. We define the
agribusiness debt financing provided by financial
institutions that behave ethically as “ethical source of
external debt financing”. According to Ghosal and
Ray (2015), banks offer crop loans at 7% annually,
while private moneylenders charge 20-30%, if not
more. Although, private lenders who may not behave
in an ethical way charge very high interest rates on
agricultural loans, they have less strict debt financing

requirements. Because of less strict debt financing
requirements, farmers become prey to predatory
lenders from private lending institutions that do not
fall under the control of the central bank.
Literature shows that financial institutions use “5
Cs” of credit -- character of borrower (reputation),
capital (leverage), capacity (volatility of earnings),
collateral, and condition (macroeconomic cycle) to
make credit decisions (see Strischek, 2009;
Bandyopadhyay, 2007). If a majority of “5 Cs” of
credit is weak, the lenders decline farm loan
applications. Thus, “5 Cs” of credit decisions create
barriers to agribusiness financing, which has a
negative impact on the growth and survivability of
agribusiness firms. Therefore, any assistance that can
help agribusiness firms’ access to debt financing will
be beneficial to the growth and survivability of
agribusiness firms. This study concentrates on the
factors affecting ethical sources of external debt
financing.
Different theories in the area of debt financing
have been developed since the pioneer study of
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Although different
theories have been proposed and developed to explain
the capital structure of the firm, these theories do not
provide much information on the factors affecting
access to ethical sources of agribusiness debt
financing. For example, the tradeoff theory of Miller
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(1977), the pecking order theory of Myers (1984), the
agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), and the
market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) do
not provide the factors that minimize barriers to farm
debt financing. In addition, these theories are not
directly applicable to the farming industry because the
nature of this industry differs from other industries
such as manufacturing and service industries (Guan
and Oude Lansink, 2006). However, capital structure
models developed by Collins (1985) and Barry,
Baker, and Sanint (1981) indicated that debt ratio is a
decision variable and the optimal debt ratio is found
when the farmers’ expected utility is maximized (Wu,
Guan, Myers, 2014, p. 2).
As with many other firms, the majority of
agribusiness firms start small where family members
act as the members of the board of directors to make
important decisions including debt financing. In most
cases, the head of the family acts as CEO of the firm.
Gill, Mand, and Obradovich (2015) found that nonresident Indian family members (NRIs) of small
business firms in India play a role by providing
financial support to their family members in India and
by serving on the board of directors. Thus, corporate
control of agribusiness firms resides in the hands of
family members.
Literature also shows the impact of access to
credit on farms’ capital structure decisions. While
some studies used proxies such as age and credit
scores (e.g., Bierlen et al., 1998; Barry, Bierlen, and
Sotomayor, 2000), others such as a study conducted
by Sandhu, Hussain, and Matlay (2012) used
collateral, loan guarantees, loan repayment capacity,
social status, education, solid financial data, default
risk, administrative costs, and information asymmetry
to study barriers to farm financing. To remain
consistent with previous studies, the current study
used proxies from previous studies to find the factors
affecting access to ethical sources of external debt
financing for the agribusiness firms.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is
as follows. Section two examines the previous
literature and develops hypotheses. Section three
describes the data and methodology used to
investigate our research questions. Section four
discusses and analyzes the empirical results. Section
five concludes and considers the implications of the
findings.
2. Literature Review
Because small business firms are financially
constrained (Joeveer, 2013) and associated with
higher volatility (Bottazzi, Secchi, and Tamagni,
2014), these firms have lower access to bank loans
(Canton et al., 2013) and face tighter pricing terms
and conditions (Drakos, 2013). The majority of
agribusiness firms in India are either small or medium
sized firms. The Indian provision of Micro, Small, and
Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act of

2006, classifies Micro, Small, and Medium
Enterprises (MSMEs) into two categories -manufacturing and services. Agribusiness firms fall
into the category of production firms since they
produce agricultural products. Lahiri (2012, p. 4)
classified MMSEs based on their limits for investment
in plant, machinery and equipment for manufacturing
and production enterprises in India as follows:
Enterprise
Micro
Enterprises
Small
Enterprises
Medium
Enterprises

Investment in Plant and Equipment
 Does not exceed twenty five lakh
(2.5 million) rupees.
 More than twenty five lakh (2.5
million) rupees but does not exceed
five crore rupees.
 More than five crore (50 million)
rupees but does not exceed ten crore
(100 million) rupees.

Agribusiness firms are similar to firms in other
industries in terms of lenders applying financing terms
and conditions. Sandhu, Hussain, and Matlay (2012)
identified factors that represent barriers to credit
access for agribusinesses such as lack of loan
collateral, loan guarantees, loan repayment capacity,
social status of farmers, education of farm owners,
and lack of solid financial data. In addition, these
authors identified other barriers such as high default
risk, higher administrative costs, and information
asymmetry.
Because credit risk is the largest risk faced by
lending institutions such as banks and private lenders
in agricultural loans, they use the “5 Cs” of credit to
mitigate lending risk in the farming industry.
However, private lenders may not be as strict as banks
(that behave ethically) in applying the “5 Cs” of
credit, and they charge a very high interest rate. If the
“5 Cs” of credit are weak, they create barriers to
access to ethical sources of external debt financing for
agribusiness firms and, consequently, lenders decline
the agribusiness loan application. Bandyopadhyay
(2007) argued that the structure and conduct of
agricultural lending has been changing rather
dramatically over the past two decades because of
contractual and ownership arrangement issues,
locational issues, management quality, and risk
management issues; thus, the agricultural lending
decision-making process is becoming much more
complex and it creates barriers to agribusiness debt
financing.
The
following
literature
review
encompasses five sections based on the “5 Cs” of
credit and provides additional details on factors
affecting access to ethical sources of external debt
financing.
2.1 Factors affecting the character
(reputation) of borrowers and possible
ways to reduce their impact on ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt
financing
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Credit Bureau records of agribusiness firms and
their owners demonstrate their history of loan
payments. Poor credit history and information
asymmetry issues (i.e., farm owners have better
information than creditors) reflect unfavorably on the
character of borrowers. These factors, in turn, affect
the social status and creditability of borrowers, which
create barriers to access to ethical sources of
agribusiness debt financing. Although a bad credit
record may stem from such things as minor disputes
between creditors and customers over credit card fees,
it nevertheless creates barriers to agribusiness debt
financing because lenders consider it as an important
determinant of risk management (Gill et al., 2014).
Lenders perceive poor character as a serious issue
because it can lead to loan repayment delinquency;
therefore, lenders tend to decline loan applications for
those with character issues. Dierkes et al. (2013)
found that financial institutions highly value business
credit information to lower their realized default rates.
To minimize the issue of poor credit bureau
history (if it exists), agribusiness borrowers should
aggressively clarify the issue to lenders whether it was
due to a dispute over, for example, credit card fees.
Agribusiness borrowers should also build social
capital (relationships between lenders and clients)
with bankers to build trust. In addition, poor moral
values create informational asymmetry issues. Schoar
(2012) found that the personal interaction between
borrowers and bankers reduces moral hazard
problems and the default risk on loans.
The literature shows that non-resident Indian
family members (NRIs) provide financial support and
help their family members in India (Gill, Mand, and
Obradovich, 2015); therefore, it is strongly
recommended to use the social capital of NRIs (if one
has NRIs) to build social status with lenders and to
reduce information asymmetry, which may reduce
barriers to agribusiness debt financing. Social capital,
in the context of this study, is defined as the networks
of relationships among family members living abroad.
Financial support from NRIs reduces issues of
fallback position and lack of liquid assets, which arise
from the lack of timely cash flows.
NRIs, in return for supporting their family
members, expect their families to protect their
existing assets in India. NRIs also expect their family
members to build their assets by obtaining higher
rates of return from agribusiness firms. Thus, both the
NRIs and their family members can benefit. NRIs
serve as foreign directors on the board of directors of
many small business firms (Gill et al., 2015) and visit
India from time to time due to their strong ties with
family members living in India. During their visits,
NRIs meet different bank managers as a part of social
networking. NRIs also build social capital with Indian
banks by making deposits and by investing funds in
the Indian economy (The Press Trust of India, 2011).

2.2 Factors affecting capital (leverage)
and possible ways to reduce their impact
on access to ethical sources of external
agribusiness debt financing
Another barrier to farm financing is a high level of
debt (leverage) which impacts the loan repayment
capacity of borrowers as explained by Sandhu,
Hussain, and Matlay (2012). Du and Dai (2005), using
data of East Asian firms, found that controlling
owners prefer a higher level of debt. Vakilifard et al.
(2011) showed a positive relationship between CEO
duality and level of debt financing, and a negative
relationship between board size and leverage in Iran.
However, these studies used data from publically
traded firms. Since family members control many of
the unlisted agribusiness firms, the same situation
may not prevail. Higher levels of debt in the capital
structure can be considered another barrier to
agribusiness debt financing. The board of directors in
which NRIs serve as foreign directors (Gill, Mand,
and Obradovich, 2015) make capital structure
decisions. Poor management of agribusiness firms can
lead to higher leverage which can create barriers to
further debt financing. The involvement of NRIs can
help minimize the barrier to access to debt financing
due to poor management.
The majority of unlisted agribusiness firms in
India does not maintain proper records and does not
prepare financial statements used by financers; thus,
lenders do not get all the necessary information they
need to make lending decisions and tend to reject
agribusiness loans. Poor agribusiness planning can
also lead to a higher level of leverage. Agribusiness
education and training will assist owners of
agribusiness firms to minimize issues related to their
lack of business records and financial statements.
Literature shows that small business firms perform
better with the involvement of NRIs (Gill, Mand, and
Obradovich, 2015). Better performance makes
management appear stronger and minimizes barriers
to external agribusiness debt financing by improving
their loan repayment capacity.
The higher level of debt, however, may not
actually belong to the farm borrower(s). Agribusiness
owners, to support the businesses of immediate family
members and relatives, may have borrowed funds.
Therefore, family members and relatives, in this
situation, are responsible for the debt repayment and
not only the borrowers themselves (Gill et al., 2014).
However, Schoar (2012) found that personal
interaction between borrowers and bankers reduces
default perceptions of lenders.
2.3 Factors affecting loan repayment
capacity (volatility of earnings) and
possible ways to reduce their impact on
access to ethical sources of external
agribusiness debt financing
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Because of cyclical performance, seasonal production
patterns, high capital intensity, leasing of farmland,
and annual payments of real estate loans, agribusiness
firms tend to fall into financial difficulties to make
debt liability payments (Bandyopadhyay, 2007).
Agribusinesses typically repay loans on an annual
basis rather than monthly because the cash flow cycle
is an annual cycle for the farming industry. Volatility
in agribusiness’ financial performance mainly comes
from fluctuations in commodity prices and weather
conditions (Bliss, 2002; Ghosal and Ray, 2015).
These characteristics may impact agribusiness loan
repayment capacity. The annual cash flow cycle of
agribusiness firms, impacts credit risk for agricultural
loans. For example, poor cash inflow increases default
risk for creditors and thus, default risk creates barriers
to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt
financing.
To improve the capacity of agribusiness to repay
loans, agribusiness borrowers should consider
improving their fallback position by involving other
parties such as NRIs. The involvement of NRIs can
improve firm performance (Gill, Mand, and
Obradovich, 2015). Financial support from NRIs
builds internal financing sources that reduce issues of
fallback position and lack of liquid assets, which
come from the lack of timely cash flows.
2.4 Factors affecting collateral and
possible ways to reduce their impact on
ethical sources of external agribusiness
debt financing
The unavailability of collateral is also a barrier to
ethical sources of external agribusiness debt
financing. Collateral, in the context of this study, is
defined as the availability of tangible and intangible
assets to be pledged by borrowers. Because farmers
lease farmland to produce agricultural products, they
lack the availability of tangible assets used as
collateral (Bandyopadhyay, 2007). One should not
ignore the fact that joint family systems are prevalent
in Asian communities, which are also prevalent in the
farming industry. In addition, residential and other
properties are sometimes registered in the names of
parents out of respect. Therefore, agribusiness
borrowers should disclose all information and parents
should be included in the agribusiness loan
applications where applicable for collateral purposes
(Gill et al., 2014). The issue of availability of tangible
collateral arises when agribusiness owners, for
example, open and operate poultry and/or dairy farms
because of the nature of live-stocks and intangibility
of assets such as operating licenses issued by
franchisors. The co-signing of family members and
other parties increases the possibility of securing
agribusiness debt financing.
2.5 Factors affecting market conditions
(macroeconomic cycle) and possible

ways to reduce their impact on ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt
financing
Characteristics of farm businesses include cyclical
performance and seasonal production patterns, which
increase default risk (Bandyopadhyay, 2007). Demand
for and supply of agricultural products both negatively
as well as positively affects the farming industry.
Unfavorable weather conditions causes volatility in
the market (International Monetary Fund, 2015).
Market volatility affects character, capital, capacity,
and collateral of agribusiness borrowers. For example,
floods may ruin both the land and crops of
agribusiness firms, which has a negative effect on
these firms. However, co-signers and retained
earnings can reduce this barrier to ethical sources of
external agribusiness debt financing. The appearance
of NRIs leads to better agribusiness management
decisions, which can assist in selling agricultural
products on time at better prices by exploring
different markets.
2.6 Summary of literature review
In summary, internal financing sources, collateral,
agribusiness performance, and corporate control with
the participation of NRIs can improve access to
ethical sources of external agribusiness debt
financing.
A higher level of debt in the capital structure can
lead to rejection of agribusiness loans. Literature
shows that NRIs provide financial support to their
family members in India, which increases internal
financing sources. Higher internal financing sources
decrease the level of leverage. The appearance of
NRIs on the board of directors makes the management
team appear stronger and leads to better corporate
decisions, which in turn improves firm performance
(Gill, Mand, and Obradovich, 2015) and increases the
chances of maintaining solid financial data and having
stronger agribusiness planning. Improved financial
performance and a higher level of internal financing
sources reduce the level of debt leverage and,
consequently, the chances of loan default. Thus, there
are several factors that can assist agribusiness owners’
access to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt
financing. Hence the following hypotheses:
H1: The appearance of NRIs is positively
associated with access to ethical sources external
agribusiness debt financing.
H2: Higher levels of internal financing sources
are positively associated with access to ethical
sources external agribusiness debt financing.
H3: The availability of collateral is positively
associated with access to ethical sources external
agribusiness debt financing.
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H4: Higher level of agribusiness performance is
positively associated with access to ethical sources
external agribusiness debt financing.
3. Methodology
3.1 Research design
We collected sample data for this study by conducting
a survey among agribusiness owners in the Punjab
states of India. First, a large number of residents from
Punjab have been living abroad for many years
(Varrel, 2012), and they usually maintain strong home
ties. Second, many of Punjabi non-residents are
engaged in self-owned businesses overseas compared
to other non-resident Indians, and thus are capable
enough to invest in their home (Varrel, 2012). Finally,
due to high GDP growth in Punjab, Punjabi nonresident business owners experience higher growth
opportunities and better return on investment in
Punjab than in other parts of India (The Times of
India, 2014).
A non-probability (purposive and snowball)
sample was constructed because the majority of the
owners of the agribusiness firms were reluctant to
participate in a research study. To obtain a reasonable
sample size, an extensive list of agribusiness owners’
names and telephone numbers was used to distribute
surveys and to conduct telephone interviews. We
collected responses from a total of 122 (34.86%)
interviewees out of 350 agribusinesses over the
telephone and through personal visits. We discarded
two of the survey responses due to inconsistency and
incomplete answers.
Common method bias does not appear to be a
problem because our variables, although self-reported,
are largely measured objectively. Nevertheless, a
factor analysis (e.g., Podsakoff and Organ, 1986)
indicated that common method bias does not seem to
be a concern for this study.
3.2 Variables and their measurements
We chose several variables used commonly in similar
studies. Further, we limited the total number of
variables due to the small sample size and for our
convenience in conducting surveys over the
telephone. To collect raw data for constructing the
variables, we designed the survey questions such that
respondents felt comfortable disclosing information
with confidentiality. For instance, rather than asking
for disclosure of actual sales revenue in the recent
year, we provided five individual ranges of sales, such
as, total sales of (i) INR 0 – INR 500,000, (ii) INR
500,001 – INR 1,000,000, (iii) INR 1,000,001 – INR
2,000,000, (iv) INR 2,000,001 – INR 3,000,000, (v)
more than INR 3000,001.
Ethical sources of external debt financing.
Ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF)
for the purposes of this study is defined as the extent

to which agribusiness owners perceive that they
borrow funds from financial institutions that i) behave
in an ethical way, ii) donate funds for the welfare of
society, and iii) work against money laundering.
Following the definition, we selected three separate
components to measure the ESEDF index. We
categorized their responses on a five-point Likert
Scale assigning 5 as “Extreme” and 1 as “None”.
Responses were initially collected for each of the
above three sources of external debt financing. The
three measures are highly correlated with correlation
values ranging from 0.85 to 0.94. Therefore, we
constructed a new index by using principal component
analysis (PCA). We constructed the FPSA index using
the first component, which explains approximately
93.41% of the variation1.
Financial performance. The definition of
financial performance of agribusiness firms (FPAF)
for the purposes of this study is the agribusiness
owners’ general perception about the changes in net
profit margin, return on investment, and cash flow
from operations of their agribusiness firms. Following
the definition, we selected three separate components
to measure the FPSA index. In the survey, we asked
all participants to rate the extent to which they believe
there are changes in (i) net profit margin, (ii) return on
investment, and (iii) cash flow from operations of
their agribusiness firms. Their responses were
categorized on a five-point Likert Scale assigning 5 as
“Gone up a lot” and 1 as “Gone down a lot”.
Responses were initially collected for each of the
above three sources of financial performance. The
three measures are highly correlated with correlation
values ranging from 0.71 to 0.91. Therefore, we
constructed a new index by using principal component
analysis (PCA). We constructed the FPSA index using
the first component, which explains approximately
88.59% of the variation2.
Internal financing sources. Internal financing
sources (IFS) measures agribusiness owners’ capacity
to invest his or her personal and family assets in his or
her own agribusiness firm. IFS is measured as a
categorical variable where IFS = 1 if an agribusiness
owner has adequate internal (personal and family)
financing sources to invest in agribusiness firm.
Alternatively, IFS = 0 if an agribusiness owner does
not have adequate internal (personal and family)
financing sources to invest in an agribusiness firm.
Collateral. The availability of collateral (COLL)
is measured as a categorical variable where COLL = 1
if the agribusiness owner has collateral available for
the lending institutions. Alternatively, COLL = 0 if no
collateral is available for the lending institutions.
1

The eigenvalues of the four principal components are 2.802,
0.153, and 0.045, respectively. Factors that have eigenvalues
greater than one are included in the construction of the
component (Kaiser, 1960)
2
The eigenvalues of the four principal components are 2.658,
0.290, and 0.053, respectively. Factors that have eigenvalues
greater than one are included in the construction of the
component (Kaiser, 1960).
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Non-resident Indians. Non-resident Indians
(NRI) is measured as a categorical variable where
NRI = 1 if any family member of agribusiness owner
lives outside India. Alternatively, NRI = 0 if none of
their family members reside overseas.
Board size. Board size (BS) is measured as the
actual number of members of the board of directors
(partners). For empirical analyses, we calculated the
natural logarithm (ln) of average number of board of
directors.
CEO duality. CEO duality (CD) is a dummy
variable with assigned value of 1 if an agribusiness
owner/operator is both CEO and Chair of the same
agribusiness firm, or 0 otherwise.
Firm size. Firm size (FS) is a categorical
variable. In the survey, we identified five different
firm sizes as follows: (i) INR 0 – INR 500,000, (ii)
INR 500,001 – INR 1,000,000, (iii) INR 1,000,001 –
INR 2,000,000, (iv) INR 2,000,001 – INR 3,000,000,
(v) more than INR 3000,001. During the survey,
respondents chose only one category to which the
average sales of their business belong. For empirical
analyses, we calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of
average sales.
Firm Age. Firm age (FA) is measured as the
actual age of an agribusiness firm. For empirical
analyses, we calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of
actual age of agribusiness firms.
Interest rate. Interest rate (INT) is measured as
the actual interest rate that agribusiness firms pay to
lending institutions. For empirical analyses, we
calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of actual interest
rate paid by agribusiness firms on their borrowings.
Age. Owner age (AGE) is measured as the actual
age of an agribusiness owner. For empirical analyses,
we calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of actual age
of agribusiness owners.
Education. The education of an agribusiness
owner (EDU) is a categorical variable with an
assigned value of 1 = High school or less, 2 = College
diploma, 3 = Bachelor’s degree, 4 = Master’s degree,
and 5 = PhD degree or more.
Agribusiness owner experience. An agribusiness
owner’s years of experience (EXP), is measured as the
actual number of years of owner experience. For
empirical analyses, we calculated the natural
logarithm (ln) of average number of years’
experience.
Gender. Owner Female Gender (GN) is a
dummy variable indicating whether agribusiness
owners report that they are female.
4. Analysis and Discussion of Empirical
Results
4.1 Empirical Model
Financial performance of agribusiness firms (FPAF),
internal financing sources (IFS), availability of
collateral (COLL), and corporate control with the

participation of NRIs (i.e., BS and NRI) in the board
of directors minimize barriers to external debt
financing and thus, improve access to ethical sources
of external debt financing (ESEDF). Therefore, we
use five main explanatory variables to estimate the
following model:
Yi = α0 + α1FPAFi + α2IFSi + α3COLLi +
α4BSi + α5NRIi +∑Xij + εit
In the model, i refers to an individual
agribusiness firm, Yi is ESEDF for agribusiness firm
i, and Xij represents individual control variables (j)
corresponding to agribusiness firm i. εit is a normally
distributed disturbance term. In the estimated model,
α1, α2, α3, α4, and α5 measure the magnitude at
which FPAF, IFS, COLL, BS, and NRI affect an
access to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt
financing for agribusiness firms. We extend this
model by considering different set of control variables
once at a time. We estimate the coefficients of
variables of model by applying ordinary least square
(OLS) regressions3.
4.2 Descriptive Data Analysis
In the dataset, some of the variables, except ESEDF
and FPAF indices, are individual dummy variables.
The data exhibits that the distribution of both ESEDF
and FPAF is almost symmetrical around their mean
values and thus there is no outlier present in either of
these indices. We examined the differences in
variables among individual firms with and without
bank financing. Indian banks are considered as
behaving in an ethical way because they are
controlled by the central bank.
We found that agribusiness firms with higher
financial performance and higher financial resources
have enhanced ability to access ESEDF (0.76 versus 0.92) compared to other agribusiness firms with lower
financial performance and lower financial resources,
and their differences are significant at the one percent
level. We observe that agribusiness firms with higher
financial performance (0.38 versus -0.46) have better
access to ESEDF compared to other firms with lower
financial performance, and their differences are
significant at the one percent level.
Further, we observe that the mean IFS score
among agribusiness firms with access to ESEDF is
0.82 compared to 0.20 in the case of agribusiness
firms financed by private lending institutions, and
their differences are significant at the one percent
level. Likewise, the mean COLL score among
agribusiness firms with access to ESEDF is 0.90
compared to 0.22 in the case of firms with lower
financial resources, and their differences are
significant at the one percent level.
3

ESEDF, the first principal component of ESEDF1, ESEDF2
and ESEDF3, is a continuous variable
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We also observe that agribusinesses with NRIs,
large board size, larger firm size, and higher level of
CEO education have higher access to ESEDF relative
to the agribusiness firms without NRIs, with smaller
board size, smaller firm size, and lower level of CEO

education. Finally, the results exhibited that firms
with higher financial resources pay a lower interest
rate on external debt financing compared to firms with
lower resources that are financed by private lending
institutions (see Table 2).

Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Median
Maximum
ESEDF
0.00
1.00
-1.61
0.46
1.15
ESEDF1
3.24
1.54
1
4
5
ESEDF2
3.35
1.45
1
4
5
ESEDF3
3.40
1.51
1
4
5
FPAF
0.00
1.00
-2.47
0.33
1.26
FPAF1
3.59
1.16
1
4
5
FPAF2
3.65
1.07
1
4
5
FPAF3
3.71
1.20
1
4
5
IFS
0.54
0.50
0
1
1
COLL
0.59
0.49
0
1
1
NRI
0.39
0.49
0
0
1
BS
1.13
0.35
0.00
1.10
1.95
CD
0.53
0.50
0
1
1
FS
14.20
0.93
12.43
14.73
14.91
FA
2.95
0.73
1.10
3.22
3.91
INT
2.61
0.30
1.95
2.48
3.18
AGE
3.93
0.28
2.89
4.01
4.38
EDU
1.57
0.96
1
1
4
EXP
3.15
0.64
1.61
3.40
4.09
GN
0.73
0.45
0
1
1
FIN
0.55
0.50
0
1
1
Notes: Variables include ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF), financial performance of agribusiness firms
sources (IFS), collateral (COLL), non-resident Indian family members (NRI), board size (BS),
CEO duality (CD), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner
experience (EXP), owner female gender (GN), and financing from financial institutions that behave ethical way (FIN).

Table 2. Comparison of agribusiness firm characteristics with and without ethical sources of external
agribusiness debt financing
With ESEDF
Without ESEDF
Mean Difference
I
II
I-II
ESEDF
0.76
-0.92
1.68***
ESEDF1
4.34
1.89
2.45***
ESEDF2
4.43
2.04
2.39***
ESEDF3
4.51
2.05
2.46***
FPAF
0.38
-0.46
0.84***
FPAF1
3.99
3.11
0.88***
FPAF2
4.06
3.15
0.91***
FPAF3
4.13
3.20
0.93***
IFS
0.82
0.20
0.62***
COLL
0.90
0.22
0.68***
NRI
0.49
0.27
0.22**
BS
1.19
1.04
0.15**
CD
0.55
0.51
0.04
FS
14.35
14.01
0.34**
FA
2.91
2.99
-0.08
INT
2.40
2.87
-0.47***
AGE
3.96
3.89
0.07
EDU
1.88
1.20
0.68***
EXP
3.17
3.13
0.04
GN
0.79
0.65
0.14*
Notes: Variables include ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF), financial performance of agribusiness firms
-resident Indian family members (NRI), board size (BS),
CEO duality (CD), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner
experience (EXP), and owner female gender (GN). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Variables
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The correlation coefficient matrix exhibits that
FPAF, IFS, COLL, NRI, AGE, and EDU are
positively and significantly correlated (ρFPAF,
ESEDF = 0.529; ρIFS, ESEDF = 0.639; ρCOLL,
ESEDF = 0.687; ρNRI, ESEDF = 0.404; ρAGE,
ESEDF = 0.269; ρEDU, ESEDF = 0.299, and all
significant at the one percent level), implying that
higher financial performance, high internal financing
sources, higher collateral, appearance of NRIs on the

board of directors, older CEOs, and higher level
education of the CEO improve access to ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt financing in
India. Further, the results show a negative relationship
between INT and ESEDF (ρINT, ESEDF = -0.811),
significant at one percent implying that higher cost of
capital on agribusiness loans reduces access to ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt financing (see
Table 3).

Table 3. Correlation coefficient

ESEDF
FPAF
IFS
COLL
NRI
CD
BS
FS
FA
INT
AGE
EDU
EXP
GN

ESEDF

FPAF

IFS

COLL

1
0.529***
0.639***
0.687***
0.404***
-0.013
0.155
0.147
0.025
-0.811***
0.269***
0.299***
0.160
0.043

1
0.457***
0.525***
0.353***
-0.061
0.217**
0.244***
0.052
-0.442***
0.206**
0.289***
0.171
0.003

1
0.671***
0.270***
-0.005
0.190**
0.157
0.170
-0.572***
0.135
0.329***
0.189**
0.106

1
0.296***
0.055
0.106
0.309***
0.119
-0.632***
0.180**
0.360***
0.199**
0.093

NRI

CD

BS

FS

FA

INT

AGE EDU EXPGN

1
-0.019
1
0.013 -0.186**
1
-0.035
0.009 0.179**
1
0.233*** -0.022 0.006 0.269***
1
-0.294***
0.034 -0.124 -0.169 -0.039
1
0.318*** -0.051 0.112
0.038 0.416*** -0.186**
1
-0.080 -0.159 0.156
0.129 -0.221** -0.274***
0.006
1
0.287*** -0.059 0.125 0.196** 0.719***
-0.143 0.665*** -0.110
1
-0.152 0.539*** 0.032
0.166 -0.015
-0.064 -0.070 -0.001 0.026

1

Notes: Variables include ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF), financial performance of agribusiness firms
(
-resident Indian family members (NRI), CEO duality
(CD), board size (BS), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner
experience (EXP), and owner female gender (GN). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.

4.3 Regression Results and Discussion
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation.
We find that higher level of FPAF, IFS, COLL, and
appearance of NRIs on the board of directors improve
access to ESEDF for agribusiness firms relative to
agribusiness firms with lower level of FPAF, IFS,
COLL, and appearance of NRIs on the board of
directors.
As shown in model specification I, the
coefficient of FPAF is 0.140, significant at the ten
percent level; the coefficient of IFS is 0.537,
significant at the five percent level; the coefficient of
COLL is 0.769, significant at the one percent level;
and the coefficient of NRI is 0.345, significant at the
one percent level, implying that FPAF, IFS, COLL,
and NRI improve access to ethical sources of external
agribusiness debt financing.
In the following model specifications, we
include a set of control variables one at a time. For
instance, in model specification II, we include

agribusiness firm’s BS and FS, and then we include
FA, INT, AGE, EDU, EXP, and GN in model
specification III. Regardless of individual model
specifications, we find significant and positive
coefficients of IFS, COLL, and NRI suggesting that a
higher level of IFS, COLL, and appearance of NRIs
on the board of directors improve access to ESEDF
for agribusiness firms relative to agribusiness firms
with a lower level of IFS, COLL, and participation of
NRIs in the board of directors. These findings remain
robust when we consider all control variables together
(refer to model specification III). The results exhibit
that higher cost of debt capital reduces access to
ethical sources of external agribusiness debt financing
(refer to model specification III).
Appendix A reports the expectations of NRIs.
The majority of the NRIs expect their family members
protect their existing assets, achieve higher rate of
return, build their assets, and maintain their properties
in return for supporting their family members.
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Table 4. Ordinary least square regression analysis
Variables
FPAF
IFS
COLL
NRI
BS
CD
FS
FA
INT
AGE
EDU
EXP
GN
Constant
N
F-test statistic
R2

I
0.140*
(1.87)
0.537**
(3.23)
0.769***
(4.39)
0.345**
(2.59)
0.091
(0.50)
-0.982***
(-4.22)
181
31.99***
0.580

II
0.147*
(1.93)
0.522**
(3.11)
0.812***
(4.44)
0.327**
(2.41)
0.105
(0.57)
-0.028
(-0.22)
-0.59
(-0.83)
-0.159
(-0.16)
181
22.71***
0.582

III
0.073
(1.22)
0.328**
(2.36)
0.328**
(2.13)
0.251**
(2.19)
0.052
(0.36)
0.021
(0.18)
-0.007
(-0.11)
-0.127
(-1.27)
-1.779***
(-8.25)
0.481**
(2.07)
0.003
(0.06)
-0.079
(-0.60)
-0.001
(-0.01)
2.930**
(2.25)
181
26.84***
0.764

Notes: In the regression models, the dependent variable is ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF). Independent
(COLL), non-resident Indian family members (NRI), board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), firm size (FS), firm age (FA),
interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner experience (EXP), and owner female gender (GN).
***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

5. Conclusion
By taking a sample of agribusiness firms, this study
concentrated on factors affecting access to ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt financing in
India. This study provides a mechanism through
which agribusiness owners may improve access to
ethical sources of external debt financing which in
turn lowers the cost of debt capital. The paper shows
that internal financing sources, collateral, and the
appearance of NRIs on the board of directors improve
access to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt
financing. Since NRIs help improve access to ethical
sources of agribusiness debt financing, agribusiness
owners should consider NRIs serving on the board of
directors. There is, however, no free lunch; that is, the
majority of the NRIs expect their family members to
protect their existing assets, achieve a higher rate of
return, build their assets, and maintain their properties
in return for supporting their family members in India.
6. Limitations
This study relies on the perceptions and judgments of
research participants because we collected data using
surveys and interviews. Not all family involvements
(or NRI associations) are the same; some NRI

families are more involved than others, and some NRI
families, by virtue of their wealth or status can
facilitate access to agribusiness financing by
providing financial support and by participating in the
board of directors as foreign members.
This is a co-relational study that investigates the
association between the perceived access to ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt financing and
the factors affecting perceived access to ethical
sources of external agribusiness debt financing. There
is not necessarily a causal relationship between the
two. The findings of this study may only be
generalized to firms similar to those that were
included in this research.
7. Future Research
Although we have bridged some gaps in the literature,
many questions still remain unanswered. One such
question is to understand how agribusinesses that have
NRIs improve access to ethical sources of external
debt financing. Since NRI families, by virtue of their
wealth or status, can facilitate access to ethical
sources of external debt financing by providing
financial support and by participating in the board of
directors as foreign members, we call for a direct and
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objective measure of the strength of this involvement
in future research.
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Appendix A

1
2
3
4

Expectations of non-resident family members in return to supporting their family members
Protect their existing assets.
Yes = 27
Higher rate of return from their investment(s) for serving on the board of directors. Yes = 25
Build their assets to reward for their investment(s).
Yes = 25
Maintain their properties.
Yes = 28
N = 48.
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No = 21
No = 23
No = 23
No = 20

